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Comparing with Germany, Japan and other developed countries, China’s legal 
environment of creditor rights is weaker, and has not enacted any legislation to ensure 
creditors’ right of participating in corporate governance. However, according to the 
stakeholder theory, creditors are no longer the passive stakeholders. They actively 
take participate in corporate governance to reduce investment risk. As creditors’ 
investment risk is closely related to the company’s risk-taking behavior, this paper 
study the creditors’ governing effect by analyzing the relationship between debt 
financing and corporate risk taking. 
In order to disclose how the debt financing influences corporate risk-taking 
behavior, this paper selects all the private companies listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2011 as research sample. 
Conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) Influence of bank loans and commercial loans 
on private listed companies’ risk taking significantly differences, bank loans inhibit 
private companies’ risk taking, and commercial loans promote private listed 
companies’ risk taking. (2)There is a significant negative correlation between the 
scale of debt financing and private listed companies’ risk taking, which indicates that 
debt financing can inhibit corporate risk taking in private listed companies, and this is 
because of bank loans’ hard binding and scale advantages. (3)Hard binding of bank 
loans can be easily softened by political connections, which leads significantly 
different influences debt financing played on corporate risk taking in directly listed 
private companies and private listed companies restructuring from state-owned ones; 
in directly listed companies, debt financing inhibits their risk taking behavior; but in 
private listed companies restructuring from state-owned ones, debt financing 
promotes their risk taking behavior. Thus, this paper draws the final conclusion: in 
more purely private listed companies, debt financing can inhibit corporate risk taking 
by restricting their investment behavior, which indicates creditors’ governing is 
effective; however, there is less debt financing restriction in private listed companies 
















through investing in high-risk projects more easily. 
The research this paper made can play a certain role in guiding corporate debt 
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企业风险承担水平反映了企业在投资决策过程中对投资项目的选择，更高的
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